RIBSTEIN IN FINAL.DOC

2/10/2009 12:03:30 PM

A QUESTION OF COSTS:
CONSIDERING PRESSURE ON WHITECOLLAR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
SARAH RIBSTEIN†
ABSTRACT
Because of the expense of defending white-collar criminal cases,
individual corporate defendants can rarely fund their own defenses
and often rely on their employers to pay their legal costs. Employers,
however, often feel pressure to refuse to pay their employees’
attorneys’ fees. When employers decline to pay their employees’
defense costs, defendants can be, in effect, coerced into pleading guilty
because they do not have the financial resources to defend themselves
at trial.
Commentators have discussed the problem of pressure on whitecollar defendants but have not traced the cause of the pressure back to
one of its most basic roots: criminalizing conduct that is prohibitively
expensive for an individual to defend. Others have addressed the
question of whether corporate behavior has been overcriminalized
but have not focused on the high cost of defending these crimes as one
of the key arguments against criminalizing the behavior in the first
place. This Note intertwines the two strands of the debate over
corporate crime: the strand evaluating the existence of and solutions
to pressure on individual white-collar defendants and the strand
questioning the overcriminalization of corporate law. This Note adds
to both strands by focusing on one aspect, high defense costs, that
contributes to the pressure, makes it unique to corporate crime as
opposed to street crime, and puts it out of the reach of commonly
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suggested procedural fixes. The Note concludes that white-collar
criminal prosecutions inherently place financial pressure on
defendants, and legislatures should consider this pressure when
deciding what behavior to criminalize.

INTRODUCTION
The often uncertain outcomes of criminal trials mean that even
innocent defendants can face a terrifying choice: accept a minimal
punishment by admitting that they have committed a crime they feel
they did not commit or risk being found guilty at trial and being
subject to a sentence many times as harsh. This was the choice facing
Jamie Olis, a midlevel executive accused of wrongdoing in an energy
1
transaction during his employment at Dynegy. Unlike many criminal
defendants, Olis was far from indigent (although not wealthy) and
was able to afford an attorney, making him ineligible for a public
2
defender. His defense was also unlike most criminal defenses: the
conduct in question involved a “complex series of [financial]
3
transactions” that a layperson would struggle to understand.
Although Dynegy had promised its executives funding for defending
job-related allegations, the firm breached its obligation under threat
4
of indictment and left Olis to fend for himself. Still, Olis was sure of
his innocence, believed he was acting according to accepted business
practices, and decided to go to trial with the defense that he could
5
afford.
Unfortunately, Olis’s defense proved to be less than he hoped
6
for and very likely less than he would have gotten if Dynegy had
1. Susan Warren, Refusing to Talk, Dynegy’s Olis Goes to Prison, WALL ST. J., May 20,
2004, at B1.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2006) (“[T]he United States magistrate judge or the court, if
satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the person is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall
appoint counsel to represent him.”). Whether the counsel Olis could afford was “adequate”
under § 3006A(a), given the high costs of defending white-collar crime, is a difficult question.
See infra Part III.B.1.b.
3. Rebecca Smith, Fraud Charged Against Former Dynegy Employees, WALL ST. J., June
13, 2003, at B2.
4. Paul Davies & David Reilly, Executives on Trial: In KPMG Case, the Thorny Issue of
Legal Fees—Dynegy’s Mr. Olis, Now in Prison, Shows Stakes in Trial of Accounting Firm’s
Executives, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at C5.
5. See Warren, supra note 1 (reporting that “Mr. Olis . . . insisted on his innocence
and . . . began to prepare for a trial” with a defense theory that he was following orders from
other Dynegy employees).
6. Id.
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honored its agreement to indemnify him. His lawyer did not contest
the government’s evidence of market loss, which became a key factor
7
in lengthening Olis’s sentence and probably would have required
8
hiring an expensive expert. Olis was sentenced to twenty-four years
9
and four months in jail, and his lawyer later said that the lack of
10
funds had “limited his ability to mount a strong defense.”
11
Jamie Olis’s sentence was later reduced to six years on appeal,
but his ordeal has been cited as an example of the problems faced by
white-collar defendants whose employers refuse to pay their legal
12
fees. During his trial, Olis “couldn’t afford the $100,000 to print the
[12 million pages of] documents” that the government had “used
13
computer programs to sort through.” As opposed to the one lawyer
that Olis could afford, who Olis could only pay by selling his house,
“[t]he government had prosecutors, Federal Bureau of Investigation
14
agents, postal inspectors and accounting experts work the case.” The
Olis case shows the “astronomical,” costs of defending corporate
15
criminal allegations —even the wealthiest white-collar defendants
16
cannot afford to fund their defenses on their own. Olis may be the
most sympathetic of the high-profile defendants who have faced the
pressures of the white-collar criminal justice system, as he is relatively
young, less wealthy than many white-collar defendants, and was
17
separated from his young daughter when he reported to prison. But
7. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2005); Kevin P. McCormick,
Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effect of Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82
TUL. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2008).
8. See McCormick, supra note 7, at 1174 (“[One] problem with market loss is that the
complexity of the calculations involved invariably places an onerous burden on both defendants
and prosecutors to provide costly experts. . . . [T]hese costs can be a huge burden on individual
defendants facing criminal charges.”).
9. Olis, 429 F.3d at 541.
10. Davies & Reilly, supra note 4.
11. Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ.com Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/12/
white-collar-legal-fees-kpmg-jamie-olis (June 12, 2007, 8:50 EST). Olis’s new lawyers did not
disclose how they were paid. Id.
12. See, e.g., Davies & Reilly, supra note 4 (using Olis’s case as a “vivid illustration of
what’s at stake” when the government presses a defendant’s former employer to stop paying his
legal fees).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Susan Beck, Companies with Backdating Troubles Are Paying Astronomical Legal
Fees, AM. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 22, 22 (documenting legal fees in stock-option backdating cases).
16. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
17. See Warren, supra note 1 (noting that Olis was thirty-eight, had an infant daughter, and
“was no highflying executive”).
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his plight is far from unique among those individuals attempting to
defend allegations of corporate misconduct.
Because of the expense of defending white-collar criminal cases,
individual corporate defendants can rarely, if ever, fund their own
defenses; instead, these defendants rely on their employers to pay
18
their legal costs. Their employers, however, often feel pressure to
19
refuse to pay their employees’ attorneys’ fees. When employers
decline to pay their employees’ defense costs, defendants end up with
inadequate defense funds and find themselves in the position of Jamie
Olis: they must either plead guilty or go to trial with a lawyer who
cannot fully defend them against the complicated allegations
corporate crime cases usually involve. Defendants are, in effect,
coerced into pleading guilty because they simply do not have the
financial resources to defend themselves at trial, where they often risk
harsh sentences many times greater than the ones they could receive
20
under a plea bargain.
There have been several attempts to alleviate the pressures faced
by defendants who cannot afford their own defense costs. Both Judge
Louis Kaplan in the Southern District of New York and a panel of the
Second Circuit have found that the Sixth Amendment prevents the
government from pressuring firms to refuse to advance attorneys’
21
fees to employees who are under criminal investigation. Judge

18. See, e.g., Laurence A. Urgenson & Audrey Harris, Is the White-Collar Defense Attorney
Headed for Extinction?, LJN BUS. CRIMES BULL., May 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://www.
kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=223&itemId=2294 (“Even if an individual defendant
is able to scrape together enough money to keep his counsel, few can afford the experts,
accountants, investigators and support staff that it takes to sort through (much less, make sense
of) the warehouses of material that their ‘cooperating’ employer gave the government.”).
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. One of the clearest illustrations of this phenomenon was in the prosecution of former
Enron executives. See John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison—Enron Ex-CEO
Faced Longer Term for Fraud, Conspiracy Conviction; Victims Fund to Get $45 Million, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at C1 (“Yesterday’s sentence also underscored the dangers of going to trial
versus the benefits of pleading guilty and cooperating with federal investigators. Andrew
Fastow, Enron’s former chief financial officer, received a six-year sentence after he pleaded
guilty to criminal charges and helped the government in its case against Messrs. Skilling [who
was sentenced to twenty-four years and four months in prison] and Lay.”); see also Ellen S.
Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 751 &
n.123 (2007) (“Deciding whether to take the risk [to go to trial] may also be a function of
money, as the cost of legal counsel can influence the ability to spend the sums necessary for a
trial . . . .”).
21. United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Stein
(Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F.
Supp. 2d. 330, 367–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Kaplan found that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
22
provides similar protection. Senator Arlen Specter introduced
legislation that would prevent the government from considering
whether a corporation is paying its employees’ legal fees when
23
deciding whether to indict. Deputy Attorneys General Paul McNulty
and Mark Filip created revised Department of Justice (DOJ) policies
24
25
that first lessened, and then eliminated, prosecutors’ ability to
consider whether an employer is paying its employees’ legal fees.
Many scholars, lawyers, and policymakers have discussed the
26
27
problem (or lack thereof ) of pressure on individual white-collar
defendants. Some have argued that the Constitution should protect
28
white-collar defendants from prosecutorial pressure. Some have
suggested nonconstitutional methods of constraining prosecutorial
29
power. Some have contended that broad corporate criminal liability

22. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364–65.
23. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B).
24. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 11 n.3 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
25. Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 13 (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memorandum],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 56 (2007)
(“[C]ourts, commentators, and practitioners should more seriously consider the connection
between the overbroad corporate criminal liability rule and the risk of overreaching by
prosecutors who use their legally-conferred blank check to ferret out corporate crime.”); Noah
D. Stein, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics and the McNulty Memo: Should the Government Scrutinize
an Organization’s Payment of its Employees’ Attorneys’ Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3245, 3276
(2007) (“[Commentators] argue that a policy that emphasizes cooperation significantly
augments the government’s power.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs 10
(Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE06-021, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920140 (“The government retains significant power to coerce
cooperation from defendants.”).
27. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1617
(2007) (“[S]eeing these differences in context reduces worry about the state’s current practices
and leads to a response to the calls for reform that, at most, would modestly restrain the state in
some respects.”); Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives’
Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2 (2006), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/
article.asp?id=641 (referring favorably to the government’s consideration, when deciding
whether to indict, of a corporation’s advancement of defense costs to its employees).
28. E.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 353 (2007) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment should afford
employees some protection against the adverse consequences of coerced disclosures . . . .”).
29. Stein, supra note 26, at 3292–93 (suggesting that clarifying the McNulty Memorandum
could curb prosecutorial pressure).
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standards necessarily give prosecutors too much power.
Commentators have not, however, traced the cause of the pressure
back to one of its most basic roots: criminalizing certain conduct that
is prohibitively expensive for an individual to defend. Those who
have addressed the question of what behavior Congress should
criminalize in the first place have not recognized that legislatures
31
must consider the pressures high legal fees place on individuals.
This Note intertwines two strands of the debate over corporate
crime: the strand evaluating the existence of and solutions to undue
pressure on individual white-collar defendants and the strand
questioning the overcriminalization of corporate law. It adds to both
strands by focusing on one aspect of the pressure on white-collar
defendants: high defense costs. These abnormally high costs increase
the pressure, make it unique to corporate crime, put it out of the
reach of commonly suggested procedural fixes, and make it an
important consideration in criminalizing corporate behavior. The
Note concludes that the pressure from high defense costs on whitecollar defendants is something that policymakers and society should
consider when deciding what behavior to criminalize.
Part I of this Note discusses the legal background necessary to
appreciate the expenses that individual white-collar defendants face
when defending allegations of corporate misconduct, exploring the
aspects of white-collar crime cases that make these defense costs so
high. Part II argues that the high costs of defending corporate
criminal charges create dilemmas for white-collar defendants that are
significantly different than the dilemmas facing defendants in
traditional crime (or “street-crime”) cases, making white-collar
defendants uniquely vulnerable to coercion during prosecutions. Part
III examines several options available to corporations, courts, and
regulators when dealing with the coercion white-collar defendants

30. See, e.g., Bharara, supra note 26, at 105 (“[T]he criticism of prosecutorial discretion is a
systemic one, which cannot be overcome either by pointing to discretion well-exercised in the
past or by addressing prosecutors’ conduct only.”); Ribstein, supra note 26, at 10 (“The
wrongdoing in [corporate criminal] cases is subtle, blame difficult to apportion, and facts hard to
find.”).
31. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, What Is a Business Crime?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127 passim
(2008) (discussing the problems with criminalizing corporate misconduct, but not including legal
fees among the problems discussed); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 passim (Summer 1997) (same); Dick
Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma
of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 passim (2007) (same);
Ribstein, supra note 26 passim (same).
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face:
corporate
employment
indemnification
provisions,
constitutional protection through the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
and stricter standards for prosecutorial misconduct. This Part
demonstrates that all are inadequate solutions to the problem,
concluding that the problem is inherent in prosecuting individuals for
these crimes. The Note concludes by recommending that pressures on
individual defendants created by high defense costs must begin to be
a consideration in the debate over how to criminalize corporate
crime.
I. EXPLAINING THE HIGH COSTS OF DEFENDING CORPORATE
CRIME
The high defense costs in corporate criminal cases stem from the
legal, factual, and mens rea questions that must be addressed in
32
white-collar criminal investigations. As many commentators argue,
prosecutors should have every tool available to them because the
types of inquiries involved in white-collar crime make these cases
33
very difficult to prosecute. The difficulty of investigating corporate
activity means that prosecutors may only be able obtain answers
through wide prosecutorial discretion and some cooperation from
34
employees and corporations. These difficulties for the prosecution,
however, translate to three equally knotty problems for defendants,
who also have limited resources to cover the costs involved in
answering the complex questions involved and who have much more
to lose by choosing to go to trial.
First, the substantive legal questions are inherently difficult to
answer because of the wide variety of behavior that could be
considered criminal misconduct under federal law. Standards for
35
criminality are vague, unsettled, and still developing, leaving unclear
32. See John Hasnas, Foreword to Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical and Managerial
Implications, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1269–70 (2007) (discussing the costs these questions
create for prosecutors in white-collar cases). Professor Hasnas points out that difficult legal,
factual, and mens rea questions make it hard to determine when to criminalize corporate
misconduct. This Note uses these three peculiar aspects of white-collar crime to explain the high
costs of defending it and to distinguish its inherent procedural problems from those in the
street-crime context.
33. See, e.g., Michael Elston, Cooperation with the Government Is Good for Companies,
Investors, and the Economy, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1435, 1437–38 (2007) (describing the
difficulties of investigating corporate crime when a company does not cooperate).
34. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 340–41 (“Unraveling the threads of an intricate corporate
fraud scheme without extensive cooperation is also a daunting challenge . . . .”).
35. Lynch, supra note 31, at 37.
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the legality of the corporation’s activity even assuming the activity
occurred. For one thing, a great deal of what is criminal differs only
subtly from standard business practices, as the widespread practice of
36
backdating illustrates. Sometimes the conduct in question has been
made illegal only recently, such as the tax shelters at issue in KPMG’s
37
case, so that the exact contours of the illegality remain unclear. As a
result, defendants can find it very difficult to predict the charges or
the outcome of the investigation because of the broad definitions of
corporate crime and the lack of precedent with which to predict
outcomes. This problem requires lawyers specializing in corporate
crime, who are often very expensive to retain. The flexibility of broad
corporate criminal laws means that prosecutors can effectively
determine whether criminal liability attaches to the conduct in
38
question. Congress has exacerbated this problem by criminalizing a
wide variety of corporate activity, “heighten[ing] the vulnerability of
39
individual employees,” and increasing penalties without always
40
providing clear standards for liability.
Second, the factual questions involved in corporate crime require
a costly process of sorting through all of the records created by a huge
business. Investigators and lawyers examining the inner workings of
corporations need to sift through extensive paper trails and interview

36. See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on
the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 566 (2007) (“Backdating has accounting
consequences when discovered, but few instances of backdating were motivated by accounting
concerns, and backdating does not represent an accounting scandal along the lines of those
perpetrated at Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco.”).
37. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees Jeffrey Stein et al. at 88 n.34, United States v. Stein (Stein
V), 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3042) (“[T]he tax shelters in this case have never been
brought before a judge, so their legality and legitimacy has never been settled as a point of
law. . . . That gives this KPMG trial an Alice-in-Wonderland quality; the accused are on trial for
promoting a fraudulent tax shelter that has never been proved to be fraudulent in the first
place.” (quotation error in original) (quoting Editorial, KPMG in Wonderland, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2005, at A14)).
38. See Lynch, supra note 31, at 37 (“Prosecutors and courts, moreover, have utilized the
broad discretion created by the criminalization of regulatory misconduct or by the vague terms
of some criminal statutes, to change the terms in which certain forms of misbehavior are seen,
and the consequences that attach to violations.”).
39. Griffin, supra note 28, at 331 (referring to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
40. Lynch, supra note 31, at 37 (“Congress, and the sentencing commission it created to
systematize criminal punishment, have significantly increased the de jure and de facto levels of
punishment for violations in many areas, including the provision of severe sanctions for some of
these innovative and sometimes poorly defined crimes.”).
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many witnesses to have any hope of figuring out what conduct
41
actually occurred. For example, in KPMG’s case, the court observed,
The government thus far has produced in discovery, in electronic or
paper form, at least 5 million to 6 million pages of documents plus
transcripts of 335 depositions and 195 income tax returns. The briefs
on pretrial motions passed the 1,000-page mark some time ago. The
government expects its case in chief to last three months, while
defendants expect theirs to be lengthy as well. To prepare for and
42
try a case of such length requires substantial resources.

Costs in white-collar crime cases can become extremely high very
early in the criminal process, such that without an advancement of
their defense costs, white-collar defendants may have to give up on
43
their defense before really beginning.
Third, determining culpability in white-collar crime requires a
difficult examination of the knowledge and subjective intentions of
numerous employees of the corporation with various levels of
responsibility. These questions are not about whether conduct was
criminal, but about whether an individual defendant’s consciousness
of the potential impropriety of his conduct reaches the necessary level
44
of scienter for criminality. There can be a subtle difference between
culpable and nonculpable mens rea of individuals, especially because
each individual is a small part of the organization and it is difficult to
tell how much the players knew about how their conduct fit into the
larger scheme of the firm’s operations. For instance, employees of
General Re charged with being involved in a fraudulent reinsurance
transaction have argued that Warren Buffett and other supervisors
authorized the employees’ actions and that they therefore could not

41. See, e.g., Urgenson & Harris, supra note 18, at 2 (referring to the “warehouses of
material” that can be produced in corporate-crime cases).
42. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (footnotes
omitted).
43. Id. at 355 (stating that fee advancement “protects the ‘ability [of the employee] to
mount . . . a defense . . . by safeguarding his ability to meet his expenses at the time they arise,
and to secure counsel on the basis of such an assurance’” (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760 (CSH), 1997 WL 334966, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June
16, 1997) (mem.))).
44. See Buell, supra note 27, at 1628 (“Mens rea both dominates the law of white collar
crime and is distinctive there in relation to other precincts of criminal law. Inquiry into mental
state in white collar cases often progresses past relatively thin cognitive states like the Model
Penal Code’s ‘knowledge’ or ‘purpose’ to concepts such as ‘willfulness,’ ‘bad purpose,’ and
‘consciousness of wrongdoing.’”).
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45

46

have acted wrongfully. Such a “deep inquiry into mental state” is
hard to perform in the context of organizations that “tend to diffuse
47
decision-making responsibility.” Further obscuring the inquiry into
precisely who knew what and when, employees who know or fear that
they were involved in misconduct have an incentive to further impede
48
the search for truth.
The inherent intricacy of white-collar crime on three different
levels means that defendants’ lawyers cannot investigate these crimes
without spending a great deal of time, which translates into a great
deal of money, sorting out the legal, factual, and intent issues. As Part
II explains, the complexity of these issues not only raises the price of
defending corporate crime, it significantly differentiates white-collar
criminal defendants from typical street-crime defendants.
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CORPORATE AND STREET CRIME
Some commentators have pointed to the similarities and
differences between the prosecution of corporate and street crime to
argue that the coercion is no worse, and reform is no more necessary,
49
in the former than in the latter. Street-crime defendants do face a
great deal of pressure and relative lack of bargaining power when
submitting to plea agreements to maintain their freedom, and Fifth
45. See, e.g., Karen Richardson, ‘‘Lies’’ or ‘‘Doubt’’: GenRe-AIG Trial Begins as Both Sides
Lay Groundwork—Former Executives Accused of Fraud in Reinsurance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,
2008, at C2 (“Reid Weingarten, lawyer for former General Re executive Elizabeth Monrad, said
Joseph Brandon, the current CEO of General Re, who isn’t charged, was ‘all over this
transaction.’ Mr. Weingarten also said Warren Buffett knew about the transaction and that, as
such, Ms. Monrad ‘never in a million years would have thought the transaction would be
shady.’”).
46. Buell, supra note 27, at 1628.
47. Hasnas, supra note 32, at 1270.
48. In some corporate-crime cases, obstruction of justice and perjury charges are the only
ones that end up sticking. Griffin, supra note 28, at 333 & n.116 (“Consider the case of Bruce G.
Hill, the general counsel of a small Boston-based software company, Inso Corp., who was
convicted on only one of two perjury charges for a false exculpatory statement but was found
not guilty of the securities and wire fraud charges that had prompted the investigation in the
first place. Similarly, in a case in which four Merrill Lynch employees had been charged with
aiding Enron’s fraudulent accounting, the Fifth Circuit tossed out all of the conspiracy and wire
fraud counts and left standing only the perjury and obstruction counts against a single Merrill
Lynch defendant.” (citation omitted)).
49. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1503, 1503 (2007) (“[T]he problems highlighted by the critics of corporate and white collar
liability are often most severe in other contexts . . . .”); Buell, supra note 27, at 1617 (arguing
that examining the differences between ordinary and corporate crime “reduces worry” about
the government’s treatment of white-collar defendants).
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Amendment jurisprudence does not protect these defendants from all
50
such coercion. The pressures on street-crime defendants are
significant and problematic, and policymakers should not necessarily
ignore those problems in favor of reforming the white-collar criminal
51
procedure. Two principal differences between corporate and street
crime distinguish the type and the level of coercion individual whitecollar defendants face, however, presenting them with a different
dilemma—that is, the choice between pleading guilty and being
unable to afford to defend themselves at all.
A. Differences in Legal, Factual, and Intent Inquiries
The difficult legal, factual, and intent inquiries in white-collar
52
crime cases that raise the costs of these defenses are significantly
different from the inquiries usually involved in traditional criminal
cases. Because white-collar cases are so much more complex, it is less
clear whether defendants have committed crimes. Prosecutors thus
enjoy greater discretion to determine whether and how to charge
white-collar cases. Prosecutors’ increased discretion can give the
government even greater bargaining power over alleged white-collar
criminals than over alleged street criminals. This power leads to a
much higher risk of pressure on defendants to plead guilty to white
collar–crime allegations than the typical street-crime defendant faces.
First, the complex legal standards involved in prosecuting
53
54
corporate crime create a very different “legal landscape” from the
one on which street-crime cases are prosecuted. In traditional
criminal cases the standards for criminality are usually much better
defined; for instance, everyone can agree that possessing cocaine is
illegal, whereas complicated accounting decisions involve questions of
criminality that courts may have never even addressed before and

50. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (“Although Brady’s plea of guilty may
well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced
that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt that his
solemn admission of guilt was truthful.”).
51. See Beale, supra note 49, at 1535 (“While these problems exist in the context of
corporate and white collar prosecutions, it would be a mistake to overlook the need for review
and reform of the greater criminal system.”).
52. See supra Part I.
53. See supra Part I.
54. Buell, supra note 27, at 1617.
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that can be nearly inscrutable to those lacking accounting expertise.
Prosecutors have little difficulty deciding whether a homicide was a
crime. In contrast, “in complex organizational settings, the
wrongdoing can be deeply nested within legitimate and valuable
56
economic activity.” Prosecutors in street-crime cases have a great
deal of discretion as to whether or not to indict, but they do not
usually have the discretion to prosecute behavior that is arguably not
57
a crime at all. This greater discretion in white-collar cases leads to a
greater risk of prosecuting noncriminal activity and therefore of
pressuring noncriminals to plead guilty.
Second, factual questions are much more difficult to answer in
the midst of the complicated internal workings of a corporation than
58
on the street. The factual questions surrounding traditional criminal
activity do not involve untangling complex organizations or
corporations’ extensive paper trails. Unlike in traditional crime, the
allegedly illegal activity in corporate crime is often committed by
many layers of employees, and the questions of what activity
occurred, whose activity was illegal, and to whom the activity can be
attributed are not necessarily clearly answered even after sorting
59
through reams of evidence. The difficulty in answering these
questions might create greater opportunities for mistakes in
corporate-crime prosecutions than in street-crime prosecutions; for
instance, prosecutors (possibly with the help of dissembling
employees covering their tracks and shifting blame) might attribute
the conduct in question to the wrong one of many possible players in
the multilayer organization. Factual mistakes and evidentiary
uncertainty may be more likely to favor the prosecution in whitecollar cases than in street-crime cases because white-collar defendants

55. See id. at 1627 (noting that it is much easier to determine whether a crime has occurred
when the allegation is murder than when it is fraud).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1628 (“The state makes decisions case by case . . . about what to treat as a
crime and what to leave for civil regulation.”).
58. The difference between street and corporate crime could be considered the difference
between a puzzle, which “grows simpler with the addition of each new piece of information,”
and a mystery, which requires sorting through and making sense of “too much information” to
answer a question that may not have a “simple, factual answer.” Malcolm Gladwell, Open
Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8,
2007, at 44, 49.
59. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate
Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 526 (2004) (“Corporate wrongdoing is less
visible and harder to detect than most street crime.”).
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have a greater resource disadvantage, pressuring them to plead guilty
when they cannot afford to defend against the allegations.
Finally, answering questions of intent is easier in the streetcriminal context than in corporate crime. Whereas mens rea is usually
a relatively straightforward question of “knowledge” or “purpose” in
traditional criminal cases, white-collar crime cases raise more difficult
intent issues; mens rea can include additional layers such as
“willfulness,” “bad purpose,” “consciousness of wrongdoing,” and an
60
increased focus on mistake of law. In addition, accused white-collar
criminals can often contend that they did not know that their conduct
was anything but business as usual, especially if a more senior
61
employee authorized it or they arguably believed it was a commonly
62
accepted business practice, such as backdating. This “searching
63
inquiry into mental state” creates yet another way in which
prosecutors have greater flexibility to determine culpability in whitecollar cases than they do in street-crime cases.
B. Government Pressure on Employers
White-collar defendants face additional pressure from their
employers, who control a source of funds for their defense.
Traditional criminal defendants who cannot afford to defend
themselves are provided with counsel according to the Sixth
64
65
Amendment and the Criminal Justice Act (CJA). It would seem
that well-off white-collar defendants backed by multibillion dollar
corporations could only be in a better position than indigent streetcrime defendants, but in one way at least, they are caught in a difficult

60. Buell, supra note 27, at 1628.
61. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62. Edward Iwata, Pay Analyst Testifies Grants ‘‘Seemed Odd’’ in Brocade Backdating
Case, USA TODAY, June 19, 2007, at 7B (“Defense attorney Richard Marmaro told jurors that
backdating was ‘a common business practice in America’ . . . . In recent years, he said, Brocade
issued backdated grants to more than 1,000 employees to recruit top talent.”); see also United
States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 524–26 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing the many documents the
government attempted to use to prove the defendant’s knowledge and specific intent to defraud
and concluding that these documents did not prove the sufficient level of intent).
63. Buell, supra note 27, at 1628.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–45 (1963)
(extending the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel to the states).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (“Each United States district court, with the approval of
the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in
accordance with this section.”).
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situation in which the criminal justice system protections are not
available to them. Despite white-collar defendants’ relative wealth,
often the only ones willing and able to pay their attorneys are their
employers, because very few individual defendants can actually afford
66
to fully defend a white-collar criminal case. The government,
however, has a unique ability to prevent white-collar defendants from
being able to fully fund their defenses by pressuring their employers
not to pay these fees.
When prosecuting corporate crime cases, the DOJ has
historically considered a corporation’s payment of its employees’
67
attorneys’ fees when deciding whether or not to indict the firm, and
firms under threat of indictment have often given in to pressure to cut
68
off indemnification of their employees. At the time of the events
69
precipitating the United States v. Stein decisions, the Thompson
70
Memorandum provided guidelines for the DOJ in its decisions to
71
indict corporations. It explicitly suggested that prosecutors use a
corporation’s payment of its employees’ defense costs as one of
several indications of the corporation’s cooperation in the

66. Urgenson & Harris, supra note 18, at 2; see also United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F.
Supp. 2d 390, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“This is not to say that the Constitution guarantees anyone
charged with a crime representation by a ‘Dream Team’ or a multimillion dollar defense. But, as
Stein I held, it does guarantee those who can afford it the right to spend their money for the best
(or, what is not always the same thing, the most expensive) defense that money can buy, free of
unjustified interference by the government. It also, as a general matter, prevents the
government from interfering if a criminal defendant is fortunate enough to have someone who
is willing to give the defendant the money to pay for a defense, even a very expensive one. The
vice of the government’s actions here was that the government improperly interfered with the
payment of defense costs that KPMG otherwise would have paid . . . .”); Podgor, supra note 20,
at 751 n.123 (“News reports suggested that Enron’s former chief accounting officer Richard
Causey’s plea was motivated by the cost of attorney fees . . . .”).
67. The government tends to focus on the corporation’s cooperation when making its
charging decisions. Until the change from the Thompson to the McNulty Memorandum,
prosecutors treated a refusal to pay employees’ attorneys’ fees as one element of cooperation.
Elston, supra note 33, at 1436.
68. See, e.g., Davies & Reilly, supra note 4 (discussing the fee cutoff in both the Olis and
Stein trials).
69. The Stein litigation has prompted a number of decisions. United States v. Stein (Stein
I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d. 315
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein III), 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Stein
IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 390; United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
70. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys pt. VI.B (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm.
71. Id.
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72

Eventually, the Thompson Memorandum was
investigation.
replaced by the McNulty Memorandum, which changed the
guidelines slightly: it prohibited the DOJ from considering payment
73
of defense costs as a measure of cooperation except in “rare cases.”
That change, however, was widely agreed to have little or no effect on
the amount of pressure on corporations: the DOJ did not have to
disclose its reasons for deciding whether to indict, and corporations
would still want to signal the utmost cooperation by cutting off their
74
employees’ legal fees.
Ultimately, the Filip Memorandum replaced the McNulty
Memorandum. This new version of the guidelines may appear to have
resolved the issue by flatly prohibiting the DOJ from considering
75
attorneys’ fees in its charging decisions. But for the same reasons
that the McNulty Memorandum’s changes to DOJ policy were
probably ineffectual in reducing pressure on corporations, the Filip
Memorandum will also probably not solve the problem—the
government is still not required to disclose what it considered when
deciding how to charge, and incentives that create a likelihood of
perceived pressure remain. The same broad prosecutorial discretion
that pressures individual defendants to plead guilty can create even
greater pressure on corporations because indictment sometimes
76
threatens a firm’s very existence, giving employers strong incentives
to surrender to any perceived government pressure to cut off
advancement of employees’ defense costs. As the U.S. Attorney said
72. Id.
73. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 24, at 11 n.3.
74. See, e.g., Bharara, supra note 26, at 78–79 (observing that, “in most important respects,”
the provisions of the Thompson and McNulty memoranda that concern how the government
assesses the culpability of corporations and considers its own source of authority and leverage,
“the new [McNulty] guidelines are identical to the [Thompson] guidelines [they] replaced”);
John Power, Note, Show Me the Money: The Thompson Memo, Stein, and an Employee’s Right
to the Advancement of Legal Fees Under the McNulty Memo, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1205,
1235 (2007) (“[W]hile the McNulty memo aims to limit the circumstances under which
advancement [of an employee’s legal fees] may be considered by prosecutors, consideration
about advancement may remain, albeit pushed to an unspoken, underground level.”).
75. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13.
76. See, e.g., Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481,
1483 (2007) (“[W]hat matters is that upon the mere announcement of an indictment, a
corporation is effectively punished as if a guilty verdict had been returned.”). The pressure on
corporations described here tends to apply largely to certain types of firms whose reputation or
ability to secure clients will be most affected by an indictment. Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D.
McConnell, Annual Corporate Pre-Trial Agreement Update – 2007, at 4–5 (Mar. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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about KPMG’s cooperation with the investigation during negotiations
over a deferred prosecution agreement, “Let me put it this way, I’ve
77
seen a lot better from big companies.” Whether or not prosecutors
faithfully put all knowledge of the corporation’s fee payment policy
out of their minds when making charging decisions, corporations
know that their every action might affect the decision.
Therefore, despite language to the contrary in the Filip
Memorandum, corporations may deem it necessary to refuse to
advance their employees’ defense costs to avoid indictment,
especially if other corporations under investigation are willing to cut
off advancement of fees, potentially creating a feedback loop in which
no corporation will risk paying its employees’ fees. Further enhancing
prosecutorial discretion, courts have continually broadened the scope
of criminal corporate liability such that almost any conduct by any
employee can lead to a finding of liability of the firm under the
78
respondeat superior and “collective knowledge” doctrines. Thus,
corporations are in a tenuous position with extremely little bargaining
power and will scramble to cooperate with the government to secure
79
deferred (or non-) prosecution agreements. Further, although
corporations use indemnification and advancement agreements to
attract employees, they have the financial incentive to place some
80
limits on these agreements. Whether or not the government does
anything to induce a corporation to cut off its employees’ fees, the
corporation could decide on its own not to fund an employee’s
defense past a certain point. Whatever the reason, the employee is
left effectively defenseless and pressured to plead guilty.
Traditional street-crime defendants face well-documented
pressure to plead guilty, and the Fifth Amendment does not fully
81
protect them from this pressure. They face broad prosecutorial
discretion, a lack of bargaining power, significantly greater sentences
77. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting
David N. Kelley, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York).
78. See George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High Crimes:
Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417,
1421–28 (2007) (describing the Supreme Court’s expansion of corporate criminal liability).
79. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 327 (“Because virtually no company will risk indictment,
prosecutors have come to expect compliance with every government demand.”).
80. See, e.g., Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. CIVA. 023-N, 2004 WL 556733, at *10 (Del.
Ch. 2004) (acknowledging the financial risk placed on companies by unlimited advancements
but rejecting that risk as a basis for nonenforcement of a contract), aff’d, 888 A.2d 204 (Del.
2005).
81. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
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if they lose at trial than if they agree to a plea bargain, and often the
damning testimony of codefendants who have cut a deal with the
government. White-collar defendants, however, face similar pressures
with the additional wrinkle of their extremely high defense costs: they
may find the option of going to trial almost completely infeasible due
to their lack of resources if their employers do not pay their defense
costs. The contention that white-collar criminals face a different kind
of pressure does not suggest that the traditional criminal justice
system is not also in serious need of reform. Rather, it illustrates that
white-collar defendants are subject to a different dilemma that is, in
some ways, more problematic than the one street-crime defendants
face.
III. APPROACHES TO ALLEVIATING THE PRESSURE
Pressure on white-collar criminal defendants is a problem, then,
but what is the solution? One possibility would be to prevent the
pressure before it begins by ensuring that white-collar defendants are
adequately indemnified for their legal fees; if their employers could
not withdraw financial support from their employees, defendants
would have the resources to fully defend themselves at trial and
would not feel coerced into pleading guilty. A second type of solution
is constitutional protection, which Judge Kaplan and the Second
Circuit have found covers at least some instances of prosecutorial
influence on corporate employers; under this approach, defendants’
broadly defined procedural rights would limit prosecutors’ power.
Third, prosecutorial guidelines, ethical rules, or legislation could
regulate prosecutorial conduct directly. This Part examines each
approach and concludes that inherent procedural aspects of whitecollar prosecutions make each solution infeasible or ineffective.
A. Indemnification Agreements
Although firms commonly agree to indemnify their employees
for their legal fees, corporate employees cannot necessarily rely on
their employers to protect them from the difficult choice between
pleading guilty and mounting a defense they are unable to afford. The
DOJ policy, as outlined in the Filip Memorandum, ostensibly
prevents
the
government’s
consideration
of
preexisting
82
indemnification provisions when assessing a firm’s cooperation, but
82. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13.
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employers could still feel intense pressure to cut off fee advancement
for the reasons Part II.B discussed. Violations of the DOJ policy are
83
84
difficult to detect and to enforce. Further, employers face their own
financial pressure to cut off indemnification and advancement at
some point; they may not want to risk providing limitless defense
funds to an employee who could later be convicted or found to have
85
acted in bad faith. Thus, some pressure to cut off indemnification
likely remains, despite the changed guidelines.
Given that firms likely still face pressure to stop paying their
employees’ legal costs, will they do so despite having contracted to
advance their employees’ fees? Employers often agree to indemnify
86
their employees and advance fees beyond the legal minimum. They
have an incentive to offer generous indemnification and advancement
provisions to attract talent and encourage some risk taking from
employees who fear bankruptcy or being unable to pay for their
87
defense if their behavior is later alleged to be criminal. Most states
have indemnification statutes that allow various levels of contractual
indemnification and often require some level of indemnification, but
these statutes usually only require reimbursement of fees after a
88
successful defense. Because defendants usually cannot afford to pay
83. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
84. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 21.
85. See, e.g., Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1395-N, 2006 WL 985361, at
*10 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting a corporation’s argument that the court should stay an
indemnification action until an SEC investigation concluded whether the former directors acted
in bad faith).
86. The court found that California statutes applicable to some of the KPMG defendants
required that they be advanced costs if the costs were related to the defendants’ employment
and that they be indemnified unless their actions were “unlawful and ‘believed to be unlawful’
at the time.” United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 356 n.119 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802(a) (West 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (West 2006)). The
applicable Delaware law allows partnerships to indemnify their partners as set forth in the
partnership agreements. Id. at 355 n.117 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-110 (2006)).
87. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) (“Indemnification
encourages corporate service by capable individuals by protecting their personal financial
resources from depletion by the expenses they incur during an investigation or litigation that
results by reason of that service. . . . Advancement is an especially important corollary to
indemnification as an inducement for attracting capable individuals into corporate service.”).
88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2006) (“To the extent that a person or
former director or officer of a corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in
defense of any action . . . such person shall be indemnified against expenses (including
attorney’s fees) actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection therewith.”); see
also Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 354–55 (observing that “[t]oday, all states have statutes
addressing the indemnification of corporate directors, officers, employees, and other agents”
and describing those statutes).
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for their defenses out of pocket during the investigation and trial,
89
most states also allow firms to advance fees during litigation.
Firms often have flexibility in determining the terms of their fee
advancements to employees, so they have the option of drafting
90
agreements that cut off the payment of fees at some point. A finite
advancement agreement can leave an employee in the same position
as if the government had pressured the corporation to cut off defense
fees: the individual defendant is still left unable to adequately defend
against the likely complex charges. And even with the most generous
possible advancement agreement, employers have strong incentives
to cut off fees and risk their employees suing them for breach of
91
contract. Suing an employer when criminal charges are pending
might be too inconvenient for the employees, so the risk of suit might
not be that significant. In any case, though, lawsuits take time, and
after waiting for the uncertain outcome of a lawsuit, it may be too late
for an employee to pay for a proper defense without being sure of
reimbursement. Therefore defendants may not see suing their
employers for their attorneys’ fees as a viable option and may feel
forced to forego a full defense because they lack the resources. Even
if defendants do choose to go to trial (likely with inferior counsel) and
later sue for reimbursement, the threat to the firm of such a suit may
in many cases pale in comparison to the threat of being charged with
criminal misconduct, because the latter could destroy the
92
corporation. If in practice firms are willing to breach an
indemnification agreement in response to perceived government
pressure, they will likely continue to do so to save the corporation.
Even if employers are later found responsible for their employees’
attorneys’ fees, it may be too late for the employees to fully defend

89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (“Expenses (including attorney’s fees)
incurred by an officer or director in defending any civil, criminal, administrative or investigative
action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of
such action . . . .”); see also Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (“[M]any states authorize business
entities to advance defense costs to their personnel . . . .”).
90. See, e.g., Adobe Systems Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), ex. 3.1, art. XI, § 43(c)
(Sept. 23, 2005) (Amended & Restated Bylaws), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/796343/000110465905045524/a05-16703_1ex3d1.htm (limiting fee advancement when
the board of directors determines that the officer or director acted in bad faith or against the
corporation’s interests).
91. See supra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text; infra note 109 and accompanying text.
92. See supra Part II.B.
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Therefore,
themselves by the time they are reimbursed.
indemnification and advancement provisions cannot reliably lift the
financial pressure on individual defendants.
B. Constitutional Protections
When legal procedures are unfair, it might seem logical to look
to the Constitution to prevent injustice. In fact, two courts have
invoked constitutional safeguards to protect white-collar defendants
94
from the pressure their high defense costs create. But others have
argued that courts cannot stretch these constitutional doctrines to
apply to the type of coercion that arises from the cost of defending
95
corporate crime. And even if the Constitution can, in theory, protect
white-collar defendants from the pressure this Note describes,
applying its protections might, in practice, be impossible. This Section
outlines the doctrinal and practical problems associated with using
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to protect individual white-collar
defendants from financial pressure to plead guilty and concludes that
neither amendment can fully protect them.
1. The Sixth Amendment. In Stein, the district and appellate
courts both held that the Sixth Amendment protected the defendants
96
from the conduct of the DOJ in its prosecution of KPMG. Sixth
Amendment doctrine fits poorly, however, with the type of pressure
that white-collar defendants face because of their high defense costs,
and even if it applied doctrinally, it could be prohibitively impractical
to implement its protections.
a. Doctrinal Issues. Despite the holdings in Stein that the Sixth
Amendment protected against the DOJ’s conduct when it prosecuted

93. See Posting of Peter Lattman, supra note 11 (“[A] Texas jury ruled that Dynegy
improperly cut [Olis] off in a bid to avoid a criminal indictment of the energy company [four
years ago]. The jury ordered Dynegy to pay Olis’s attorney Terry Yates, who brought the case,
$2.5 million in damages. The company plans to appeal. For Olis, 41 years old, the decision was a
hollow victory.”).
94. United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Stein
(Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
95. See Margulies, supra note 27 (arguing that Stein III’s application of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments “make[s] it a dangerous precedent that will increase agency costs and moral
hazard for owners of business organizations, and reduce the government’s ability to combat
stonewalling of investigations that is disfavored under both the legal ethics rules and substantive
law”).
96. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 136; Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367–69.
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97

KPMG, those courts arguably misapplied the doctrine to cover the
98
facts of that case, and future cases will be even harder to fit into a
Sixth Amendment rubric.
First, a corporation’s usual practice of advancing attorneys’ fees
to its employees does not necessarily make those advancements the
defendants’ own resources, which the Sixth Amendment requires,
such that government interference with fee advancements amounts to
99
interference with defendants’ choice of counsel. The cases relied on
100
in United States v. Stein (Stein I) for the holding that the government
improperly interfered with defendants’ choice of counsel could also
stand for the proposition that defendants do not have an absolute
101
right to their choice of counsel. In Wheat v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that a trial court could reject the defendant’s
counsel of choice due to a “serious potential for conflict[s of
102
103
interest],” and in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States
the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to prevent the defendant
from using funds he allegedly earned through illegal drug
104
trafficking. Unlike the right to the effective assistance of counsel,
“which is an irreducible minimum under the Sixth Amendment,”
105
defendants’ rights to choose their own counsel is not “absolute” and
courts arguably should limit it when it may severely hamper a
criminal prosecution or when defendants attempt to use allegedly illgotten funds (here, from their alleged corporate misdeeds) for their
defense. In addition, future cases will likely present a different
situation—one in which the corporation has explicitly contracted to

97. See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (“It protects, among other things, an individual’s
right to choose the lawyer or lawyers he or she desires and to use one’s own funds to mount the
defense that one wishes to present.” (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988);
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989))).
98. See Margulies, supra note 27 (“[T]he court’s legal holdings are difficult to support.
While the court asserted that the defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to advancement of
legal fees, precedent holds only that the defendant has a right to ‘spend his own money’ to
secure counsel.” (emphasis added) (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626)).
99. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619.
100. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
101. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
102. Id. at 164.
103. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
104. Id. at 632.
105. Brief for the United States of America at 56, United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d
130 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3042) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561
(2006)).
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106

advance an employee’s attorneys’ fees, making it less likely that a
court will find that the resources do not belong to the employee.
Second, violations of the Sixth Amendment must be perpetrated
107
by the government or by action attributable to the government. But
the government likely is not demonstrably responsible when it is
ultimately the corporation that has directly impeded the defendants’
ability to retain adequate counsel. Under the Filip Memorandum,
which prohibits the outright consideration of attorneys’ fees, it will be
even harder than it was in Stein to demonstrate that government
action caused interference with defense counsel because the decision
to cut off fees will be even less attributable to the government and
more to the corporation. Given that “scholars who seek to constrain
the private exercise of authority through the extension of
108
constitutional limits to nonstate actors face an uphill battle,” a
finding of state action will be hard to justify doctrinally when the
government will presumably avoid the appearance that it is
considering attorneys’ fees at all. In fact, the corporation could be
acting solely on its own to cut off its employees’ fees, possibly based
on its own determination that its employees have committed
109
wrongdoing or based on internal financial pressure, in which case
the individual defendant is left without a constitutional remedy.
b. Practical Problems. Even if courts follow the Stein courts’
reasoning and continue to find state action despite the change in DOJ
guidelines, they may have trouble delineating the extent of these
Sixth Amendment protections. Applying the Sixth Amendment to
indirect pressure on white-collar defendants creates a variety of

106. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 218 (Del. 2005) (“[M]ost Delaware
corporations do adopt advancement provisions as an inducement . . . [to] attract[] the most
capable people into corporate service.”).
107. Thompson v. Mississippi, 914 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that although the
sheriff’s department permitted an accidental run-in between a witness and defendant, there was
no state action because the run-in “was not authorized, arranged, or requested by” the
government).
108. Griffin, supra note 28, at 365 (referring to the state’s practice of obtaining incriminating
statements through private actors).
109. See, e.g., DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., Civ.A. No. 1384-N, 2006 WL 224058, at *2
(Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting a company’s attempt to interpret its indemnification and
advancement provisions narrowly when the company sued a former employee for breaches of
fiduciary and contractual obligations); Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. CIVA. 023-N, 2004 WL
556733, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2004) (rejecting the corporation’s argument that the provision in its
bylaws for advancing fees to a former officer should not be enforced because of the financial
strain it would place on the corporation), aff’d, 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005).
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practical problems: given these defendants’ inevitable high defense
costs, the questions of who will pay the costs and how they will be
paid will be difficult to answer.
In traditional criminal cases, the government can and does pay to
110
provide indigent defendants with adequate representation, easily
solving Sixth Amendment problems that arise from a lack of defense
funds. In corporate criminal cases, on the other hand, many
defendants have enough money that they are likely not eligible for
public defenders unless they first spend all of their resources on their
111
defense. Even very wealthy white-collar defendants often cannot
afford the level of representation necessary to fully defend the types
112
of charges they face. In any case, the government simply could not
afford to cover the defendants’ costs to the extent necessary to
provide them the defense they would otherwise choose; a government
defender would not have nearly the same expertise or resources as
113
the expensive defense counsel that an employer would fund. The
remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation is to restore defendants to
the position they occupied before the government interfered with
their choice of counsel, which in some cases could arguably be
114
achieved by appointing counsel under the CJA. This is likely
impossible in corporate criminal prosecutions, however, because
defendants would have to spend all of their money to become eligible
for a CJA lawyer, and they still would not get their counsel of

110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (“Each United States district court, with the approval
of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in
accordance with this section.”).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(noting that under the CJA plan for the Southern District of New York, “the retention of assets
in excess of those essential to provide ‘the necessities of life’ would be disqualifying”).
112. See id. at 423 (discussing the financial states of the defendants and concluding that
“[n]one of them can afford to defend this case at any meaningful level”). In Stein IV, the
government conceded that an estimate of $3.3 million in defense fees for one defendant was
“very conservative,” and other lawyers estimated that the cost could be between $7 and $24
million. Id. at 424.
113. Id. at 419.
114. See id. at 419–21 (finding that, in that case, a CJA appointment could not restore
defendants to their original positions because they would have had to “spend down” their
resources to qualify and the CJA attorney would have been limited by a maximum fee that was
much less than what KPMG would have paid); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (“Each United
States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in
operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially
unable to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this section.”).
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choice. Therefore, for instance, in United States v. Stein (Stein IV)
the government conceded that dismissal was the only possible remedy
for most of the defendants given the finding that the government had
117
violated their Sixth Amendment rights. Dismissing all prosecutions
in which employers do not pay defendants’ legal fees could
significantly frustrate prosecuting white-collar crime.
Even if courts decide that the government must provide some
portion of a white-collar defendant’s costs, or provide some type of
representation, it would be difficult to determine how much the
government must pay or how skilled a public defender must be to be
constitutionally adequate. For white-collar defendants who are
eligible for public defenders, requiring the government to pay
significantly more for white-collar defenses than the $7,000 the CJA
118
allots would raise serious issues of unfairness and inequality, and
$7,000 would make an insignificant dent in the typical cost of
119
defending the types of allegations involved.
2. The Fifth Amendment
a. Doctrinal Problems. The Stein I court also held that the
government’s actions toward KPMG violated the individual
defendants’ Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights to
“obtain and use in order to prepare a defense resources lawfully
available to him or her, free of knowing or reckless government
120
interference.” The court found this right to be a fundamental
substantive due process right, subject to strict scrutiny, and further
found that the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office were not narrowly tailored to a compelling
121
governmental interest. In Stein IV, the court found that the
government’s conduct, “us[ing] KPMG to strip any of its employees
who were indicted of means of defending themselves,” “shocked the

115. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22.
116. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
117. Id. at 425.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2).
119. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (presenting estimates of one defendant’s total fees
ranging between $3.3 and $24 million).
120. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 361–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The
Second Circuit did not reach the Fifth Amendment question on appeal. United States v. Stein
(Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008).
121. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364–65.
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conscience” and thereby violated the defendants’ substantive due
122
process rights.
Judge Kaplan’s constitutional analysis includes some possible
doctrine infirmities. First, although the court in Stein I referenced
many cases in which courts upheld the rights to various aspects of fair
procedure, it did not cite any cases finding that defendants have the
123
right to use someone else’s funds to pay for their defenses. In
addition, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not
previously found even the broader “right to fairness in the criminal
124
process” to be a fundamental right. Thus the court declared an
arguably new fundamental right of a criminal defendant “to obtain
and use in order to prepare a defense resources lawfully available to
125
him or her.” Bolstering the argument that this right was not
previously considered to be fundamental, the Supreme Court in
Caplin & Drysdale had addressed a question of using available funds
to pay for a defense without declaring that the question involved a
126
fundamental right or applying strict scrutiny. If the right to use
available resources in one’s defense is not a fundamental right, it is
not subject to strict scrutiny and would likely pass the less stringent
rational basis test because of the government’s interest in preventing
127
corporations from protecting culpable employees.
Second, the court’s finding that the prosecution’s behavior met
the “shocks the conscience” standard is questionable. The standard is
not easy to delineate, but it is arguably not met when a prosecutor
128
pressures a corporation to withhold its employees’ legal fees. In the
past, courts have often required a much higher level of coercion to
find a violation of substantive due process rights, including

122. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 415.
123. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357–59.
124. Id. at 360.
125. Id. at 360–62.
126. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989) (“We are
called on to determine whether the federal drug forfeiture statute includes an exemption for
assets that a defendant wishes to use to pay an attorney who conducted his defense in the
criminal case where forfeiture was sought. Because we determine that no such exemption exists,
we must decide whether that statute, so interpreted, is consistent with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.”).
127. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that the assisted suicide
ban was not a fundamental interest and “unquestionably” met the rational basis requirement for
validity).
128. See Margulies, supra note 27 (arguing that more is usually required for a finding of a
substantive due process violation of the right to fairness in a criminal proceeding).
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129

involuntary stomach pumping, using a defendant’s own lawyer
130
against him, and hiding a criminal investigation to collect evidence
131
In KPMG’s case, the
and avoid constitutional protections.
government’s actions were nearly imperceptible; the government
132
made only subtle references to attorneys’ fees during negotiations
and followed a policy (in the Thompson Memorandum) that included
payment of attorneys’ fees as one factor among many to consider in
133
indictment decisions. In the future, under the Filip Memorandum,
the DOJ is unlikely to exhibit any outward signs of pressure at all
134
because the policy explicitly forbids it to consider attorneys’ fees.
The government may even have nothing to do with an employer’s
decision to cut off fees; in such cases, the individual defendants would
still be left without defense funds and would still feel pressure to
plead guilty, but the lack of state action would leave them without
recourse to the Fifth Amendment.
b. Practical Problems. Even if courts agree with the Stein court
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against
135
government pressure on employers to cut off advancement of fees,
the question remains how this protection would apply in practice.
Because corporate crime is so difficult to investigate, prosecutors
often need a defendant corporation’s help to sort through its
136
complicated inner workings. The corporation could, in some cases,
be interfering with the government’s prosecution by advancing its
employees’ attorneys’ fees to help protect culpable employees by
137
“circling the wagons.” Applying the Fifth Amendment could also
create spillover problems in other instances of potential coercion. The
Fifth Amendment could, for example, prevent the government from
using other methods of obtaining corporations’ cooperation, such as

129. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209–10 (1952).
130. United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1523 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
131. United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088–89 (D. Or. 2006).
132. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
133. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 72, pt. V1.B.
134. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13.
135. Extending the Fifth Amendment to cover government pressure on employers to cut off
advancement of legal fees to employees is unlikely if most courts follow the Supreme Court’s
lead and generally protect the government’s prosecutorial power. See Bharara, supra note 26, at
104–05 (“Stein is in spirit at odds with a century of utilitarian Supreme Court decisions mostly
deferential to law enforcement.”).
136. See supra Part I; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
137. Margulies, supra note 27.
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encouraging employee testimony, that are arguably necessary for
138
prosecuting white-collar crimes.
It will also be extremely difficult to prove when the government
is acting coercively. In KPMG’s case, the payment of attorneys’ fees
was expressly a consideration in the Thompson Memorandum and
the prosecutors did make references, albeit oblique ones, to
139
attorneys’ fees in negotiations with KPMG.
The Filip
Memorandum, however, will prevent the DOJ from outright
considering payment of fees, meaning that it will be much harder to
show when the government’s actions caused employers to cut off their
employees’ fees. In fact, the government does not have to act at all for
employers to feel pressure to cut off fees: firms often have the
incentive to do so whether or not the government has actively
pressured them, either to avoid indictment or for reasons having
140
nothing to do with government action.
C. Prosecutorial Regulation
If constitutional prohibitions cannot prevent prosecutorial
pressure on corporations, changing the rules that prosecutors follow
in making their indictment decisions may rein in some of the coercive
141
conduct. This change would involve strengthening the standards by
which prosecutorial conduct is judged and making sure these
standards have enough authority that prosecutors will actually follow
142
them. The necessarily broad discretion that prosecutors enjoy
makes it difficult, however, to control the process by which they make
their charging decisions.
The Filip Memorandum already provides guidelines that
technically prohibit prosecutors from considering advancement of
143
defense costs. But this seemingly straightforward answer to the
problem may not relieve the pressure on individuals. One reason is
that this change in the guidelines from the Thompson Memorandum
likely has merely driven consideration of fee payment under the table
138. See Buell, supra note 27, at 1643 (discussing the problems with extending Fifth
Amendment protections to employer-coerced statements).
139. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
140. See Stone, supra note 80, at 6–12 (detailing the reasons a corporation may want to cut
off its employees’ defense costs).
141. Stein, supra note 26, at 3292–93 (suggesting that clarifying the DOJ’s prosecution
guidelines could curb prosecutorial pressure).
142. Id.
143. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13.

RIBSTEIN IN FINAL.DOC

884

2/10/2009 12:03:30 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:857

and has had little or no effect on the actual pressure on
144
corporations. Making the standards for charging considerations
more explicit does not make the government’s considerations any
more visible, and in any case these guidelines do not provide
defendants with a remedy in court and are not otherwise enforceable.
Any attempts to directly constrain prosecutorial pressure on
corporations to stop paying their employees’ defense costs face
significant enforcement problems. The Filip Memorandum guidelines
145
and U.S. Attorneys’ Manual are not enforceable in court.
Defendants likely would struggle to prove violations of even
146
enforceable standards (for example, legislation or bar association
ethical rules) because they cannot see what the prosecution actually
considered when deciding whether to indict. As Judge Kaplan
pointed out in Stein I, “whatever the government may do in the
privacy of U.S. Attorneys’ offices and in the DOJ’s Criminal Division
147
is not what defense lawyers see,” so defense lawyers likely will
advise corporations to cut off advancement of attorneys’ fees if they
have any reason to believe that it will help the corporation avoid
indictment. As a result, any constraint on prosecutorial discretion
would have to make prosecutors’ considerations transparent enough
that defense lawyers actually believe that prosecutors are adhering to
it. Although imposing stricter standards could make prosecutors’
considerations more visible and reduce their ability to apply pressure,
prosecutors could continue to consider attorneys’ fee advancement if
they had incentives to make it difficult for corporations to protect
their employees.
Prosecutors do have incentives to make it difficult for individual
defendants to defend themselves by placing pressure on their
corporate employers. The high-profile nature of corporate-crime
cases and the public’s desire to see alleged corporate criminals
harshly punished often encourage prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas
144. See, e.g., Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 76, at 1488 (“While the McNulty Memo may
contain some limitations not found in the Thompson Memo, corporations under investigation
must still offer and give complete and genuine cooperation in order to escape an indictment.
What this means in practice is still somewhat of an open question.” (footnote omitted)).
145. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-1.100 (2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam; Filip Memorandum,
supra note 25, at 21.
146. For example, Senator Arlen Specter proposed a bill that would have legislated
something like the guidelines that were incorporated into the McNulty Memorandum.
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong.
147. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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or verdicts; public perception may already be that the defendants
must be guilty based on the estimated widespread harm of their
148
actions. The public approval of successful prosecutions of corporate
crime means that prosecutors often go through the “revolving door”
149
into lucrative private-practice careers. Prosecutors have, and the
public encourages them to use, increased powers to fight the “war” on
150
corporate crime. Prosecutors also have the incentive to enter
deferred prosecution agreements rather than indict firms and risk
destroying the companies, harming the economy, and drawing public
disapproval. Instead they prefer focusing on the guilt of individuals in
the company, which avoids these consequences while still successfully
151
punishing the misconduct. As long as the government considers
criminal prosecution to be an important tool for regulating corporate
misconduct, and as long as societal pressure to search out and punish
corporate wrongdoers exists, individual prosecutors will continue to
have motivations to wield their power over corporations to get as
much cooperation from them as possible, including the refusal to pay
employees’ defense costs.
Given these incentives, prosecutors may still continue
considering the payment of attorneys’ fees when making charging
decisions despite rules designed to prevent them. More importantly,
even if prosecutors do not actually consider a firm’s advancement of
defense costs in charging decisions, corporations, seeing these
incentives, likely will still feel pressure to cut off their attorneys’ fees
just in case doing so will save them from indictment. Many white-

148. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 315 (“[T]he perceived scope of contemporary corporate
crime has inspired particularly zealous tactics.”).
149. See Revolving Door, WASH. POST, Nov. 4 2007, at F3 (reporting the hiring of “David
Esseks, former federal prosecutor who led the government’s fraud case against Refco, as
litigation partner of law firm Allen & Overy in London”); Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ.com
Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/10/13/chicago-law-firms-bid-for-berkowitz (Oct. 13,
2006, 11:07 EST) (“Sean Berkowitz, the head of the Enron Task Force, plans to join a Chicago
law firm sometime later this year. . . . If Berkowitz heads to the other side, he will continue the
trend of Enron Task Force members leaving their government wages behind for high-paying
law firms.”); see also Ribstein, supra note 26, at 4 (“For many of these lawyers, Enron is not a
disaster, but a launching pad into lucrative big firm practice or a political career.” (citing Carrie
Johnson, After Enron, Fighting off the Job Offers, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at D2)).
150. Griffin, supra note 28, at 315–16 (comparing the war on corporate crime to the wars on
terrorism and drugs and the expansion of power in the USA PATRIOT Act and increased drug
criminalization to “new cooperation requirements [that] allow prosecutors to compel individual
employee statements, to constrain defense resources, and in some cases of derivative
obstruction, effectively to create the crime” (footnote omitted)).
151. Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 76, at 1483.
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collar defendants will inevitably face some level of coercion to plead
guilty as a result of the high costs of defending corporate crime and
their lack of funding to defend themselves.
CONCLUSION
The pressures this Note describes are inherent in corporatecrime prosecutions. They are not necessarily simply due to bad
prosecutorial practices, and when they are, these practices will be
difficult to curb because of the strong motivations behind them and
the necessary lack of transparency in the prosecutorial process. The
pressures on white-collar defendants arise from a confluence of
factors, all of which are unavoidable aspects of corporate-crime
prosecutions: the difficulty of getting evidence, the unclear criminal
standards, and the intricate mens rea inquiries. No constitutional
protections, indemnification agreements, or attempts to change
prosecutorial behavior will be able to eliminate the intense pressures
on the parties to white-collar criminal prosecutions or the difficulty
inherent in defending them.
Scholars debating the criminalization of corporate behavior
address several fundamental reasons for narrowing the coverage of
criminal law in the corporate context. In weighing the costs and
benefits of when to use criminal rather than civil remedies,
commentators have considered the breadth of prosecutorial
152
153
discretion, the moral basis for punishment, the difficulty of
154
judging guilt, and the effectiveness of noncriminal remedies to deter
155
the behavior. Although this Note’s analysis indirectly touches many
of these factors, it focuses on one that commentators have not
previously weighed: the financial cost of defending these crimes. Like
some of the other considerations scholars have addressed, the high
price of defense separates corporate crime from other types of crime
and contributes to the unique pressure on corporate defendants.
Unlike some of the other considerations, even procedural or most
legislative adjustments cannot directly fix it; any investigation into the
complicated workings of a corporation is necessarily expensive to the
156
point of being beyond the means of almost any individual.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Lynch, supra note 31, at 58–60.
Id. at 48–52.
Ribstein, supra note 26, at 5–6.
Booth, supra note 31, at 128–33.
See supra Part I.
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Because the problems are inherent in the criminalization of
corporate behavior, legislators must consider them when passing
criminal laws. Others have suggested legislative reform that would
clarify and limit the criminalization of corporate conduct with an eye
157
to limiting prosecutorial discretion. Commentators have suggested
158
avoiding the
instituting an affirmative good faith defense;
159
imposition of criminal penalties on regulatory infractions; and a
threefold approach involving limiting the respondeat superior
standard, imposing a presumption of due diligence in corporate
behavior, and establishing a presumption against indictment of a firm
unless the government shows that civil and regulatory options are
160
inadequate.
This Note does not attempt to propose a specific legislative
solution, but rather identifies a previously undeveloped approach to
the debate. This Note suggests a way to evaluate legislative options; if
a suggested reform would not lower the financial burden on
defendants or the pressure on them to plead guilty, then the reform
would not resolve the coercion problems this Note has outlined.
When deciding whether to criminalize certain corporate behavior, the
legislature should consider the implications of its decision for
individual defendants; when criminalizing corporate conduct would
create the type of unfair pressure this Note has described, the
legislature should instead turn to other methods of dealing with the
wrongdoing, such as civil remedies or regulatory oversight. When
legislating, Congress must look beyond punishment and deterrence
and consider whether, in practice, criminal laws would subject
defendants to impossible dilemmas. If, as this Note argues, the
pressures on white-collar defendants are inherent in the process of
prosecuting white-collar crime, then policymakers must consider
these pressures when balancing the costs and benefits of criminalizing
the behavior in the first place.

157. Bharara, supra note 26, at 107.
158. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007).
159. Thornburgh, supra note 31, at 1285–86.
160. Pamela H. Bucy, Why Punish? Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1287, 1303 (2007).

